Shabir Ahmad
On 22 October 1947, Pakistani-backed tribal raiders from the North-West Frontier Province launched Operation Gulmarg, pouring into the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. What began as a calculated attempt to seize the state by force left large swathes of territory under illegal occupation. Seventy-nine years later, that occupation—now encompassing Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan—stands as the most enduring unfinished chapter of India’s post-Independence integration.
Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, bringing the entire state, including the areas now under Pakistani control, into the Indian Union. Indian troops were airlifted into Srinagar the next day, preventing the fall of the Valley. Yet a ceasefire line drawn in 1949 left roughly 78,000 square kilometres of the former state under Pakistani occupation. This includes the southern strip of PoJK (approximately 13,297 sq km, administered from Muzaffarabad and comprising districts such as Muzaffarabad, Neelum, Bagh, Poonch, Kotli, Mirpur and Bhimber) and the much larger Gilgit-Baltistan region (around 65,000–72,000 sq km). Pakistan later ceded the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963, further complicating the map of illegally occupied Indian territory.
India’s legal and political position has remained consistent. On 22 February 1994, both Houses of Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that the State of Jammu and Kashmir “has been, is and shall be an integral part of India” and demanding that Pakistan vacate the areas occupied through aggression. Successive governments have reiterated that the only outstanding issue is the vacation of this illegally occupied territory. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has stated that PoJK “is a part of India and we expect one day that we will have the physical jurisdiction over it.” Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has invoked the cultural unity of the region, noting that Baba Amarnath and Maa Sharada cannot remain separated by the Line of Control
The year 2026 has laid bare the hollowness of Pakistan’s claim to have “liberated” these territories. Protests led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) over electricity tariffs, wheat prices, unemployment and the reservation of 12 legislative seats for non-resident refugees escalated into a sustained movement. Pakistani security forces responded with lethal force; independent monitors have put the civilian death toll near or above 90, with hundreds injured. Internet shutdowns, detentions of protest leaders (including reports concerning JAAC figures), and allegations of excessive force have drawn India’s attention at the United Nations, where New Delhi has called for impartial investigations into the killings.
Pakistan’s so-called elections in the region have been dismissed by the Ministry of External Affairs as a “cosmetic electoral exercise” intended to camouflage illegal occupation and conceal human-rights violations. Neither PoJK nor Gilgit-Baltistan enjoys full constitutional status within Pakistan; ultimate authority over defence, foreign affairs, security and key resources rests with Islamabad and the military establishment. Local demands for genuine political agency and an end to resource extraction have repeatedly been met with repression rather than reform.
Across the Line of Control, the contrast is increasingly stark. Seven years after the abrogation of Article 370,Jammu and Kashmir has seen expanded infrastructure, improved connectivity (including the Chenab rail bridge), rising tourism and administrative modernisation. In the occupied territories, hydropower potential estimated at tens of thousands of megawatts remains largely untapped for local benefit, while mineral wealth—including gemstones that constitute a major share of Pakistan’s production—is extracted with little return to residents. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor further entrenches strategic external interests in Gilgit-Baltistan without addressing local economic grievances.
Displaced families from PoJK, settled in Jammu and elsewhere, continue to press for justice and eventual reintegration. Organisations representing them have organised protests demanding that India act on its long-standing claim. The ancient Sharada Peeth in the Neelum Valley—once a major seat of learning and a Shakti Peeth associated with Goddess Sharada—remains in ruins, symbolising a severed cultural and civilisational link. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s reference to the impossibility of separating Shiva and Shakti across the LoC captured this deeper sense of incompleteness.
India’s post-1947 record of completing national integration—Hyderabad, Junagadh, Goa and, later, the liberation of Bangladesh—underscores that territorial questions have not been left indefinitely unresolved. The 1994 parliamentary resolution remains the clearest expression of national will on PoJK and Gilgit-Baltistan. Official maps issued after the 2019 reorganisation explicitly include these territories. Rehabilitation packages for displaced families and sustained diplomatic highlighting of conditions under Pakistani administration form part of a longer-term approach that pairs development on the Indian side with the assertion that occupation cannot become permanent through the passage of time.
As protests continue and Pakistan’s governance failures become harder to conceal, the unfinished chapter of PoJK is once again visible. For India, the territories remain an integral part of the Union whose people, resources and heritage form part of the national story. Completing that integration, by peaceful means and in accordance with the wishes and interests of the people concerned, continues to stand as a long-term national objective rooted in law, history and parliamentary resolve.