Shabir Ahmad
Recent developments in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) have triggered visible anxiety within Pakistan’s military establishment. The unease follows India’s increasingly assertive rhetoric and strategic posture regarding its territorial claims over POK, sparking fears in Islamabad of a potential Indian “action” in the region.
This reaction stems from a shift in India’s approach to cross-border security. Having demonstrated its willingness in recent years to cross the Line of Control (LoC) for strategic and security objectives, India’s signals are now being taken more seriously in Rawalpindi. In response, Pakistan has returned to its familiar playbook, issuing stern warnings, including thinly veiled nuclear threats, aimed at deterring any Indian move.
Following the cessation of hostilities earlier this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi clarified that Operation Sindoor—a military campaign initiated after the Pahalgam terror attack—was not concluded but merely paused. This statement sent a clear message that India remains vigilant and reserves the right to act again if provoked.
India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi have all issued strong statements reaffirming India’s sovereign claim over POK. Their remarks, made amid growing unrest in the region, highlight a clear shift from India’s earlier restraint on the issue.
Minister Singh went further, suggesting that military action might not even be required to reclaim POK, citing the rising anti-Pakistan sentiment among locals. Protests across the region, some carrying pro-India slogans and demands for integration, have given New Delhi both moral and political leverage.
Pakistan’s sharp reaction is understandable. The Pakistani military, long accustomed to deterring India with nuclear rhetoric, now faces an India that appears more confident and unpredictable.
Adding to Pakistan’s unease are diplomatic signals it interprets as international backing. Recent cordial exchanges between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir have buoyed Islamabad. Yet, analysts point out that Washington’s engagement is driven by economic and strategic interests—crypto investments, rare earth minerals, and real estate—not by security alignment.
Similarly, the recent defence pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, touted in Islamabad as a diplomatic breakthrough, is largely a continuation of historic cooperation rather than a new strategic shift.
India’s firm stance on POK is grounded in established policy. In May 1994, both houses of Parliament unanimously passed a resolution declaring POK an integral part of India and calling for its eventual reintegration. For decades, successive governments refrained from acting on it.
That restraint seems to be fading. The abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, once viewed as politically impossible, set a precedent for decisive action. With that constitutional step complete, speculation is mounting that reclaiming POK could be the Modi government’s next strategic objective.
The current unrest in POK may shape this trajectory. Long neglected by Islamabad, the region suffers from economic stagnation, poor infrastructure, and exploitation of local resources. In contrast, Jammu and Kashmir under Indian administration has seen visible improvements in governance, development, and security.
New Delhi views this contrast as an opportunity. By amplifying voices within POK demanding merger with India, it aims to expose Pakistan’s failures and strengthen its diplomatic narrative.
While a military operation remains a complex and sensitive choice, India is likely to continue applying diplomatic, strategic, and psychological pressure on Pakistan. The government’s recent rhetoric indicates a broader, long-term plan that blends political signaling with strategic preparation.
India’s assertive stance also serves as a clear message to the global community: it will not remain passive on an issue central to its territorial integrity. As Pakistan continues to rely on nuclear threats and political posturing, India appears ready to sustain a calibrated, multi-dimensional approach.
The question now is less about whether India should reclaim POK, and more about when and how. With growing domestic support, favorable geopolitical conditions, and strategic momentum, New Delhi may be preparing for a major recalibration—one that could redefine the power balance in South Asia.
