Dr Talat Majid
The Justice and Development Front (JDF) is a newly formed political party in Jammu & Kashmir, launched in April 2025 by former members and sympathizers of the banned Jamaat-e-Islami J&K (JeI). Its emergence signals a historic shift in the political approach of JeI-linked leadership. For decades, the Jamaat had boycotted electoral politics, particularly after the 1987 Jammu & Kashmir Assembly elections—widely alleged to have been rigged—an event considered by many historians and political observers as a turning point in the region’s turbulent history.
However, alongside JDF’s debut, a wave of commentary and criticism has resurfaced—most notably from Junaid Qureshi, who has portrayed Jamaat-e-Islami J&K as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Qureshi’s account has been widely circulated, but it is riddled with factual distortions that demand a careful, evidence-based response.
While his personal journey from extremist associations to writing is commendable, courage without accuracy can dangerously distort history. More troubling is his admission that he has passed on his skewed interpretation to his son, ensuring that yet another generation grows up with a one-sided understanding of Jamaat-e-Islami’s role in Kashmir.
For the sake of truth and historical clarity, we respond to his key allegations point by point.
1. Claim: “Jamaat was poor until militancy began, then it used Hizbul Mujahideen to get rich.”
The Facts:
Before 1990, Jamaat-e-Islami J&K was a modest socio-religious movement dedicated primarily to education, moral reform, and community service. The Kashmir issue was indeed part of its policy framework, but its constitution (Dastoor) explicitly forbade underground or militant activity.
The disruption came during the early 1990s when a small faction—led by a senior Jamaat figure and his close associates—tried to exploit Jamaat’s grassroots credibility for political and armed ambitions. Once these activities violated the principles of the Dastoor, Jamaat’s Shoora (central council) took the unprecedented step of cancelling that leader’s membership, demonstrating that organisational discipline outweighed personal loyalties.
2. Claim: “Every Hizbul Mujahideen commander was controlled by a Jamaat member who took a personal cut.”
The Facts:
This is an oversimplification and misrepresentation. Jamaat maintained its own cadre, funded through Maooda (member contributions), which covered modest salaries for full-time workers, organisational expenses, and the running of schools.
While some individual Jamaat members may have personally sympathised with or supported Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jamaat as an organisation never declared HM as its official armed wing. The official stance was always:
“Your mission for Kashmir may be great, but it cannot be under Jamaat’s banner.”
It is true that statements such as Ahsan Dar’s—claiming HM as Jamaat’s armed wing—were not publicly countered at the time. But this silence must be understood within the context of the early 1990s: Kashmir was in complete upheaval, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah had fled to London to ensure his safety, and the state administrative machinery had collapsed.
The real historical question is not whether Jamaat controlled HM—but rather how figures like Ahsan Dar were able to operate freely, and how the political instability created by the 1987 election fiasco fuelled the insurgency.
3. Claim: “Funding came via foreign donations, with 90% taken by Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan.”
The Facts:
Most militant funding in the 1990s was routed through individuals linked to Pakistan-based political groups and intelligence agencies, bypassing Jamaat-e-Islami J&K entirely. Grassroots Jamaat members, particularly in rural areas, had no knowledge of such channels.
The organisation’s primary income came from local contributions, with every Rukn (member) donating 5% of their annual earnings—a transparent and internally documented system.
4. Claim: “Jamaat invested militant funds in property and businesses across Kashmir.”
The Facts:
If such properties truly belonged to Jamaat, they would have been confiscated during the government’s ban. In reality, most of these alleged assets were privately owned by political elites who later distanced themselves from Jamaat.
The genuine institutional assets of Jamaat—schools, libraries, and offices—were built from public donations and have indeed been seized under the ban.
5. Claim: “Jamaat infiltrated government jobs to spread silent indoctrination.”
The Facts:
Jamaat’s members have historically been among the most educated in the Valley. Their entry into government service was earned through competitive examinations, not as part of an infiltration strategy. In fact, many well-qualified members resigned from secure jobs to serve the organisation full-time.
6. Claim: “The ban is ineffective because properties are hidden in other names.”
The Facts:
The 2019 ban on Jamaat-e-Islami J&K dealt a severe blow to the organisation—every registered property was seized by the authorities. The assets Qureshi refers to are likely tied to individuals or groups who left Jamaat long ago or were never organisationally part of it.
7. Claim: “Re-entering electoral politics is a ploy to protect black wealth.”
The Facts:
Jamaat boycotted electoral politics for decades after the 1987 election, citing the denial of the people’s mandate. In 2025, with evolving political realities and the prospect of more transparent electoral processes, the decision to participate again—through the Justice and Development Front—is a strategic and lawful choice.
The JDF’s participation is fully in line with Article 5 of Jamaat’s Dastoor, which requires adherence to India’s constitutional framework. Far from being a ploy, it represents a return to open, democratic engagement.
Conclusion: Correcting the Historical Record
The narrative that Jamaat-e-Islami J&K was the architect, financier, and controller of militancy in Kashmir oversimplifies and distorts a complex reality. While the organisation, like many others in turbulent times, faced internal dissent and rogue elements, its institutional framework remained committed to lawful socio-religious activism.
The launch of the Justice and Development Front is not an act of subterfuge but an open declaration that former Jamaat members and sympathisers wish to operate within democratic norms. As Jammu & Kashmir navigates a changing political landscape, historical accuracy must guide public discourse—because policy built on distorted history can only perpetuate division, not reconciliation.
[Note: Dr Talat Majid Chief coordinator
The justice and Democratic Front (JDF)]
