The present conflict is not merely a Saudi–Iranian proxy war; it is rooted in a century-old struggle over borders, security and influence
Mohd Zaid Malik
The Saudi–Houthi confrontation is commonly portrayed as another chapter in the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Iranian support has undoubtedly strengthened the Houthis, this explanation overlooks the deeper history of insecurity, territorial competition and political intervention along the Saudi–Yemeni frontier.
The relationship between Yemen and the territories to its north predates both modern states. Ancient Yemeni rulers projected their influence into western and central Arabia, culminating most famously in Abraha’s expedition towards Makkah in the sixth century. Yet this was never an uninterrupted conflict between Yemen and the Hijaz. Trade, pilgrimage, tribal migration and religious ties connected the two regions as frequently as political ambitions divided them.
The modern conflict began taking shape after the First World War. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din established the independent Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen in the north. Southern Yemen, including the strategic port of Aden, remained under British control.
At the same time, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud was expanding his authority across the Arabian Peninsula. His forces took control of the Hijaz in 1924–25, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formally proclaimed in 1932. Two ambitious states had thus emerged on either side of a frontier that had never been precisely defined.
The principal dispute concerned Asir, Jizan and Najran, regions where tribal affiliations crossed geographical boundaries and both rulers asserted historical claims. It is important to distinguish these territories from the Hijaz proper: Makkah, Madinah and Taif belong to the Hijaz, while Abha and Khamis Mushait are part of Asir and Najran constitutes a separate border region.
The territorial dispute culminated in the Saudi–Yemeni War of 1934. Saudi forces gained a rapid advantage and advanced into Yemeni territory. The resulting Treaty of Taif ended the fighting, confirmed Saudi control over Asir, Jizan and Najran, and required the withdrawal of Saudi forces from areas farther inside Yemen.
The war established the broad shape of the modern border, but it did not eliminate mutual suspicion. Yemen continued to view some of the frontier territories through the memory of earlier tribal and political associations, while Saudi Arabia remained deeply concerned about the emergence of a hostile or unstable government on its southern flank.
These anxieties resurfaced dramatically in 1962. Imam Yahya had been assassinated in 1948 and succeeded by his son, Imam Ahmad. Following Ahmad’s death in September 1962, his son Muhammad al-Badr briefly assumed power before being overthrown by republican military officers led by Abdullah al-Sallal.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser intervened heavily in support of the new republic, deploying thousands of Egyptian soldiers to Yemen. Saudi Arabia, fearing the presence of Nasser’s revolutionary army along its border, supported the Zaydi royalists loyal to Imam al-Badr.
This episode exposes the limitations of viewing the region exclusively through a Sunni–Shia lens. Sunni Saudi Arabia supported a Zaydi Shia monarchy against Egyptian-backed republicans. Strategic interest, border security and fear of revolutionary expansion proved stronger than sectarian considerations.
Contrary to some accounts, Saudi Arabia did not seize Abha, Khamis Mushait or Najran during the 1962 conflict. These areas had already come under Saudi control through the events surrounding the 1934 war and the Treaty of Taif. The Saudi objective in the 1960s was primarily to contain Egyptian influence rather than acquire new territory.
Meanwhile, southern Yemen followed a separate path. Britain withdrew from Aden in 1967, after which South Yemen eventually adopted a Marxist system. For the next two decades, Yemen remained divided between the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south.
The two states united in 1990 under President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but the merger failed to overcome their political and institutional divisions. A civil war erupted in 1994, and grievances in the south continued even after the separatist forces were defeated. The remaining Saudi–Yemeni border questions were eventually resolved through the Treaty of Jeddah in 2000.
The formal settlement of the border, however, did not settle the struggle for influence inside Yemen.
The Houthi movement emerged from the Zaydi religious and cultural revival in northern Yemen during the late 1980s and 1990s. Many Zaydis believed that their region had been economically neglected, politically marginalised and subjected to the growing influence of Saudi-supported Salafi institutions.
Led initially by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the movement developed from a cultural and religious revivalist organisation into an armed opposition force. Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis fought six rounds of war against President Saleh’s government. The conflict crossed the border in 2009, drawing Saudi forces into direct fighting with Houthi combatants.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 further weakened the Yemeni state. Saleh eventually accepted a Gulf-sponsored transition and transferred power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in 2012. Yet the transition failed to address corruption, economic inequality, military fragmentation, southern separatism or the grievances of the northern highlands.
In one of the most extraordinary reversals in modern Arab politics, the Houthis formed an alliance with Saleh, the same ruler against whom they had fought six wars. With the assistance of military units loyal to him, they captured Sana’a in 2014 and subsequently advanced southward.
Saudi Arabia viewed the Houthi takeover as an intolerable strategic threat. In March 2015, it led a military coalition into Yemen, officially seeking to restore the internationally recognised government and prevent an armed movement hostile to Riyadh from dominating the country.
Iran did not create the Houthis or the grievances that produced them. The movement was deeply rooted in Yemen’s internal religious, tribal and political landscape. Iranian support during its early stages appears to have been limited. However, as the war expanded, Tehran increased its assistance, enabling the Houthis to acquire greater missile, drone and maritime capabilities.
Saudi intervention, therefore, produced a tragic strategic consequence. It was intended to prevent the establishment of an Iranian-aligned force on the Saudi border, but the prolonged war ultimately deepened the Houthi–Iranian relationship. What began largely as a Yemeni insurgency increasingly became part of a wider regional confrontation.
The history of the Saudi–Yemeni frontier offers three important lessons.
First, the conflict is driven as much by geography and security as by religious identity. The mountainous borderlands are inhabited by communities whose tribal and social connections predate modern boundaries. Instability in northern Yemen inevitably affects southern Saudi Arabia.
Second, political interests have repeatedly outweighed sectarian loyalties. Saudi support for the Zaydi royalists during the 1960s remains the clearest historical example. Today’s sectarian language should not conceal the essentially strategic nature of the struggle.
Third, outside intervention can change the military balance but cannot create a stable political order in Yemen. Egyptian forces failed to impose a lasting settlement in the 1960s. Saudi military power has not eliminated the Houthis, just as Iranian assistance cannot resolve Yemen’s internal divisions.
The border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen may have been legally settled in 2000, but the deeper questions of security, political legitimacy and regional influence remain unanswered. No lasting peace can be achieved merely through airstrikes, missiles or control of territory.
It will require an inclusive Yemeni settlement that accommodates the country’s regional, tribal and religious diversity, along with credible guarantees that Yemen will not become a permanent platform for threatening its neighbours.
The present confrontation is therefore neither an entirely new proxy war nor an eternal conflict between Yemen and the Hijaz. It is the modern expression of an older struggle over frontier security and political influence, now made far more dangerous by state failure, advanced weaponry and regional rivalry.
