In the aftermath of Bangladesh’s February 12, 2026, parliamentary elections, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under Tarique Rahman has claimed a decisive victory, securing a supermajority and ushering in a new era post the Monsoon Revolution. Yet, amid the celebrations of restored democracy, a shadow looms large: the resurgence of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) as the principal opposition force. Though JeI failed to cut much ice in terms of outright dominance—winning only 68 seats independently and 77 through its 11-party alliance—it has emerged as a formidable player in the Jatiya Sangsad. This outcome is not just a political footnote; it is a stark reminder that religious extremism is on the rise in South Asia’s volatile neighborhood.
JeI’s performance, its best since the party’s controversial history tied to the 1971 Liberation War atrocities, signals a troubling polarization. The party’s Islamist agenda, advocating for Sharia-influenced governance and closer ties with conservative elements, resonated in pockets amid economic woes and anti-establishment sentiments. Pre-election violence, including clashes that claimed over 60 lives, underscored how JeI’s mobilization fueled unrest. While BNP’s win averts an immediate Islamist takeover, JeI’s opposition role grants it veto power on key reforms, potentially stoking communal tensions. This isn’t mere domestic churn; it’s a geopolitical tremor for India, Bangladesh’s closest neighbor.
For New Delhi, JeI’s ascent poses a multifaceted diplomatic challenge. Historically, India has viewed JeI with suspicion due to its alleged links to radical groups and anti-India rhetoric. The party’s opposition status could embolden it to critique Dhaka’s relations with Delhi, complicating border security, trade, and water-sharing pacts like the Teesta agreement. More alarmingly, it risks spilling over into India. Porous borders mean ideological exports: JeI’s success might inspire home-grown radicals in states like West Bengal, Assam, and even Jammu & Kashmir, where Islamist narratives already simmer. In Bengal, with its significant Muslim population and shared cultural ties, communal pockets could see heightened activity from outfits like the Indian Mujahideen or newer cells, encouraged by perceived victories across the border. Recent reports of cross-border infiltration and radical literature underscore this threat—encouraging local extremists could destabilize India’s eastern flank, already strained by Rohingya influxes and economic dependencies.
The Indian government must respond with calibrated firmness. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swift congratulations to Rahman were prudent, signaling support for democratic transitions. Yet, engagement with the new BNP regime should prioritize intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation to neutralize JeI’s influence. Diplomatic overtures, perhaps through SAARC revival or bilateral talks, could isolate extremists while bolstering moderate voices. Internally, India needs to reinforce deradicalization programs, enhance border surveillance via technologies like AI-driven fencing, and promote inclusive development in vulnerable regions to counter ideological appeals.
This isn’t alarmism but realism. JeI’s opposition strength, though not victorious, amplifies extremism’s echo in the neighborhood. Ignoring it risks encouraging home-grown threats, turning diplomatic challenges into security crises. India must act decisively—balancing vigilance with pragmatism—to safeguard its interests and regional stability.
