I Ahmed Wani:
On July 4, 2025, a digital storm swept through the Kashmir Valley as videos flooded social media, carrying the resolute voices of Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JeI) old guard. Senior leaders, including former Naib Ameer Muhtaram Raina Sahib, surfaced in a post by @mardikohistani, disowning the Justice and Development Front (JDF), a new political outfit claiming JeI’s backing. Another post by @Thekashmirmag featured Ghulam Qadir Wani, head of a JeI panel, asserting that decisions are made by the Majlis-e-Shoura, not rogue individuals. These videos, erupting like a thunderclap, exposed a deep rift within JeI, casting a shadow over its motives and sparking questions: Why this sudden disavowal? Is this a strategic retreat to preserve ideological purity, or a sign of internal discord in a group long known for its chameleon-like adaptability? To unravel this enigma, we must embark on a journey through JeI’s 35-year odyssey in Jammu and Kashmir—a saga of politics, militancy, and opportunism in a region scarred by conflict.
The drama gained momentum earlier in 2025 when JDF emerged as a bold new player in Kashmir’s volatile political landscape. Launched on February 23, 2025, in south Kashmir’s Kulgam district, JDF was spearheaded by former JeI members like Shamim Ahmad Thokar, Dr. Talat Majid, Ghulam Qadir Wani, and Sayar Ahmad Reshi. Positioning itself as a mainstream political force, JDF pledged to address grassroots issues—education, healthcare, youth employment, and economic upliftment—while registering with the Election Commission and securing the ‘scale’ symbol for upcoming panchayat and municipal elections. On June 30, 2025, JDF took a significant leap by joining the People’s Alliance for Change (PAC), a coalition with Sajad Lone’s Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference (JKPC) and Hakeem Yasin’s Peoples Democratic Front (PDF). Announced at a Srinagar press conference, PAC vowed to restore Article 370, Article 35A, and full statehood for Jammu and Kashmir, positioning itself as a counterweight to the National Conference’s dominance. JDF’s leaders, particularly Reshi, who secured 19,000 votes (34.4%) in the 2024 assembly elections in Kulgam, claimed to carry JeI’s legacy into the electoral fray, framing their move as an extension of JeI’s social and ideological mission.
But the July 4 videos shattered this narrative. The old guard’s disavowal suggested either a fracture within JeI or a calculated move to distance the organization from JDF’s political gambit. Was this a rejection of JDF’s mainstream aspirations, or a bid to safeguard JeI’s ideological purity amid heightened scrutiny? The answer lies in JeI’s complex history, a tapestry woven with threads of faith, rebellion, and pragmatism that has shaped its actions over decades.
The 2024 assembly elections marked a pivotal shift for JeI. For three decades, the organization had boycotted elections, denouncing them as un-Islamic and rallying its cadre to shun the polls. Yet, in 2024, JeI remained conspicuously silent as former members like Sayar Ahmad Reshi, Dr. Talat Majid, and Nazir Ahmad Bhat contested as independents in constituencies like Kulgam, Pulwama, and Devsar. This marked a radical departure from JeI’s historical stance, with leaders like Ghulam Qadir Wani advocating for the “power of the ballot” to address Kashmiri grievances. The silence was strategic. The National Conference’s sweeping victory (42 seats) in the 2024 elections, coupled with public frustration over prolonged political suppression post-Article 370 abrogation in 2019, may have pushed JeI to reconsider its boycott strategy. The unexpected success of Engineer Rashid, a jailed separatist who won the Baramulla Lok Sabha seat, further buoyed JeI’s cadre, signaling that electoral participation could yield tangible results.
However, the July 4, 2025, videos suggest a retreat. The old guard’s disavowal of JDF could stem from caution amid escalating India-Pakistan tensions, particularly after the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 tourists and reignited debates over militancy. India’s Operation Sindoor, targeting terror camps across the Line of Control, further weakened Pakistan’s influence, potentially prompting JeI to distance itself from JDF to avoid being labeled a proxy. The move also reflects internal pressures, as JeI’s conservative base may view JDF’s electoral ambitions as a betrayal of its Islamist roots.
JeI’s history in Jammu and Kashmir is a labyrinth of contradictions, shaped by its founder, Abul Ala Maududi, whose vision of an Islamic state inspired its formation in 1941. In Kashmir, JeI emerged in 1953, distinct from Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, advocating for Sharia and aligning with Pakistan’s narrative on Kashmir’s “disputed” status. In the 1950s and 1960s, JeI embraced electoral politics, peaking in 1972 with five assembly seats, including one for Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a towering figure in Kashmiri separatism. The 1987 elections, however, were a turning point. JeI, as part of the Muslim United Front (MUF), contested on a platform advocating Kashmir’s secession. Alleged rigging, which saw candidates like Mohammad Yusuf Shah (later Hizbul Mujahideen’s Syed Salahuddin) lose, fueled outrage. Many MUF supporters, including JeI cadres, turned to militancy, marking the onset of Kashmir’s insurgency.
By 1990, JeI had aligned closely with Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), its alleged militant wing, reportedly supplying recruits and resources. Through its Falah-e-Aam Trust, JeI ran schools that became radicalization hubs, with students trained in Pakistan and infiltrated back into Kashmir. JeI established Sharia courts across tehsils, enforcing Islamic codes and clashing with the secular Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The HM-JKLF rivalry turned deadly, with HM, backed by JeI, targeting JKLF cadres for their pro-independence stance, culminating in JKLF’s mass surrender in 1994 under Yasin Malik’s leadership. This period also saw JeI’s alleged collaboration with Governor Jagmohan, securing jobs in the Education Department through the Falah-e-Aam Trust, only to transform these institutions into breeding grounds for militancy.
The emergence of the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, a counterinsurgency militia, in 1994 dealt a blow to JeI and HM. Initially praised for targeting militants, the Ikhwan soon became notorious for civilian atrocities, looting, and extortion, earning them infamy in the Valley. JeI, battered by this period, sought new alliances, reportedly supporting the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) covertly while publicly denouncing electoral politics. Some JeI leaders even contested elections under PDP’s banner, though the organization maintained a facade of neutrality.
In 2004, internal fissures surfaced when Syed Ali Shah Geelani was expelled for forming Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, advocating Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan. JeI’s “Aayeeni Group” demanded adherence to Maududi’s original vision, while others prioritized Islamization or separatism. Despite a 1998 claim by then-Ameer Ghulam Muhammad Bhat that JeI was a “constitutional democratic organization,” its ties to HM persisted, undermining its credibility.
The 2019 Pulwama attack, which killed 40 CRPF personnel, led to JeI’s ban under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Leaders like Abdul Hameed Fayaz were jailed, and properties were seized. The ban, extended in February 2024 until 2029, accused JeI of fomenting terrorism and secessionism. Yet, 2024 saw JeI’s quiet return to electoral politics. Former members contested as independents, with Reshi’s strong showing in Kulgam signaling potential. This shift was driven by the abrogation of Article 370, which left JeI’s cadre detained, passports seized, and jobs denied. Leaders like Wani argued for democratic engagement to counter these setbacks, a stance that contrasted with JeI’s historical boycott calls.
The July 4, 2025, videos mark a critical juncture. By disowning JDF, leaders like Raina Sahib and Wani aim to preserve JeI’s ideological purity, distancing it from a political experiment that risks diluting its Islamist roots. This move may reflect fears of backlash from their conservative base or scrutiny post-Pahalgam, where The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility. Pakistan’s weakened position after Operation Sindoor could also have prompted JeI to avoid being seen as a proxy, especially as international focus on Kashmir intensifies. Social media amplifies this clash, with posts like @JavedBeigh’s celebrating JeI’s “mainstreaming” and @JaipurDialogues warning of JDF as a rebrand hiding old threats.
JeI’s 35-year journey is a tale of destructive opportunism. From backing HM to crushing JKLF, aligning with PDP covertly, and now disowning JDF, JeI has rarely fostered positive change. Its schools became recruitment grounds for militancy, its Sharia courts alienated Kashmiris, and its electoral flip-flops reflect a lack of coherence. The Urdu couplet captures JeI’s futility: “Illiterate storms break through the gates of palaces; what’s the use of hanging signs of prohibition?” JeI seeks to “have its cake and eat it too,” balancing militancy and politics in a transparent world where such ambiguity falters. As Jammu and Kashmir navigates its future, JeI stands at a crossroads. JDF’s formation and PAC alliance signal a desire to engage democratically, but the old guard’s disavowal reflects resistance to change. Pakistan’s lingering influence, though weakened, complicates JeI’s path. Can it shed its ambiguous legacy for a clear direction, or will it remain entangled in its own web, struggling to survive in a changing Kashmir? The Valley watches, as social media echoes with voices of division, and the specter of JeI’s past looms large over its uncertain future.
